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Martin Feldstein and David T. Ellwood 
An individual is officially classified as unemployed if  he is not working 
and is seeking a full-time or part-time job.‘ In recent years, 50% of the 
unemployed were less than 25 years old. Teenagers alone accounted for 
half of this youth unemployment or 25% of total unemployment. In 1978, 
an average of  1.56 million teenagers were classified as unemployed, 
implying an average unemployment rate of  16.3% of  the teenage labor 
force.2 
It is clear therefore that teenagers account for a large share of the high 
unemployment rate in the United States. But how much of this teenage 
unemployment represents a serious economic or social problem? How 
many of  these unemployed  are students or others seeking part-time 
work? How much of  all teenage unemployment represents very short 
spells of  unemployment of  those who move from job to job and how 
much represents really long-term unemployment of  those who cannot 
find a job or at least any job that they regard as acceptable? Among those 
who are not officially classified as unemployed but are neither working 
nor in school, how many should really be regarded as “unemployed but 
too discouraged to look” and how many should be classified as just “not 
currently interested in working”? And even among those who are offi- 
cially classified as unemployed, how many are unemployed by the official 
definition but not really interested in work at the current time? 
Martin Feldstein is president of the National Bureau of Economic Research and professor 
of economics at  Harvard University. David T. Ellwood is an assistant professor at the John 
F. Kennedy School of  Government at Harvard University and a faculty research fellow at 
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paper for the NBER Project on Youth Joblessness and Employment. We are grateful for 
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and Lawrence Summers. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be 
attributed to any organization. 
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To shed light on these questions, we have analyzed the detailed in- 
formation on youth employment and unemployment that is collected in 
the Department of Labor’s monthly Current Population Survey. We have 
not relied on the published summaries of this survey but have examined 
and tabulated the basic records on more than 5,000 individual teenage 
boys about whom information was obtained in the Current Population 
Surveys of March 1976 and a similar size sample in October 1976. Analyz- 
ing the raw data provides the very important advantage of  permitting us 
to examine a variety of special subgroups that cannot be studied with the 
published summaries. 
In particular, we decided quite early in our study to limit our attention 
to male teenagers who are not enrolled in s~hool.~  We believe that the 
problems and experience of  the in-school and out-of-school groups of 
unemployed teenagers are very different and must be studied ~eparately.~ 
Since, as we show below, half of the male unemployed teenagers are still 
in  school, looking at both groups together can obscure much that is 
important. Moreover, the social and economic problems of  unemploy- 
ment may be of greater significance for the out-of-school group than for 
those who are still in school. Limiting our analysis to boys also reflects a 
view that the problems and experiences of  the boys are likely to differ 
substantially from those of  girls of  the same age and therefore that the 
two should be studied separately. 
Even with the study limited to out-of-school young men, we have a 
sample of 1,451  individuals in October 1976. This is large enough to make 
statistically reliable estimates of  unemployment and employment rates 
for most major   group^.^  In some cases, however, for example when 
nonwhites are classified by family income, the sample becomes too small 
to permit estimates to be macie with great confidence. In these cases, as in 
others where a larger sample is desirable, it would be useful in the future 
to pool data from several monthly surveys. 
Since our analysis  refers primarily to the unemployment experienced in 
October 1976 and, in some cases, during the preceding year, it is useful to 
describe briefly the state of  the labor market  during that period.  In 
October 1976, the overall unemployment rate for the population as a 
whole was a relatively high 7.2 percent. Unemployment had been falling 
from a peak rate of  9.1 percent in June 1975. The mean durations of 
unemployment were therefore very long; the 14.2 week mean duration of 
unemployment for all the unemployed in the October 1976 survey was 
roughly 25% longer than the average duration of  11.5 weeks that pre- 
vailed in the years from 1960 through 1975. Our study should therefore be 
seen as an analysis of the experience of  out-of-school young men during a 
time in which the labor market was depressed but improving. This should 
be remembered in interpreting any of  our findings, a warning that will not 
be repeated. It would clearly be interesting to repeat our analysis for a 19  Teenage Unemployment: What Is the Problem? 
year like 1974 when the unemployment rate for all persons was only 5.6% 
as well as for 1979 when those data became available.6 
Our finding may be summarized very briefly: 
Unemployment  is  not  a serious problem  for the vast  majority  of 
teenage boys. Less than 5%  of  teenage boys are unemployed, out of 
school, and looking for full-time work. Many out-of-school teenagers are 
neither working nor looking for work and most of  these report no desire 
to work. Virtually all teenagers who are out of work live at home. Among 
those who do seek work, unemployment spells tend to be quite short; 
over half end within one month when these boys find work or stop looking 
for work. Nonetheless, much of the total amount of unemployment is the 
result of quite long spells among a small portion of  those who experience 
unemployment during the year. 
Although nonwhites have considerably higher unemployment rates 
than whites, the overwhelming majority of  the teenage unemployed are 
white. Approximately half of the difference between the unemployment 
rates of whites and blacks can be accounted for by other demographic and 
economic differences. 
There is  a small group of  relatively poorly educated teenagers for 
whom unemployment does seem to be a serious and persistent problem. 
This group suffers much of  the teenage unemployment. Although their 
unemployment rate improves markedly as they move into their twenties, 
it remains very high relative to the unemployment rate of better educated 
and more able young men. 
1. More than 90% of  all male teenagers are either in school, working, or 
both. Most  unemployed teenagers are either in school or seeking only 
part-time work. Only 5% of teenage boys are unemployed, out of  school, 
and looking for full-time work. 
Although the unemployment rate among teenage boys was 18.3% in 
October 1976, this figure is easily misinterpreted for two reasons. First, 
since most teenagers are in school and neither working nor looking for 
work, the labor force size on which this unemployment rate is calculated 
is only a fraction of the teenage population. The unemployed therefore 
represent a much smaller percentage of the teenage population than they 
do of  the teenage labor force. Second, more than half of the unemployed 
teenagers are actually enrolled in school and generally interested only in 
some form of  part-time work. 
It is reasonable to classify mature men into the “employed” and “not 
employed” and to regard the situation of  the first group as satisfactory 
from a social and economic standpoint and that of  the second group as 
unsatisfactory. This is clearly inappropriate for teenagers. The “satisfac- 
tory” group for teenagers includes those in school as well as those at work 
and therefore more than 90% of  this age group, almost the same as the 
“satisfactory status” rate for mature males. Less than 5% of teenage boys 20  Martin Feldstein and David T. Ellwood 
are unemployed, out of  school, and looking for full-time work. The 
problem of unemployment affects only a very small fraction of teenagers. 
The detailed statistics on which these statements are based are pre- 
sented in table 2.1. Nearly 70% of male teenagers are enrolled in school 
in October 1976. Among the teenage boys who are officially classified as 
unemployed, more than half (52.7%) are enrolled in school. There are 
only 79,000 boys who are out of school and seeking full-time work.’ Of 
course, the fact that half the teenage unemployed are in school does not 
mean that the unemployment rate among out-of-school teenage boys is 
half of the unemployment rate for all teenage boys. The two rates are in 
fact quite similar: 18.3% overall and 18.9% among out-of-school boys. 
It is also clear that the experience of 16  and 17  year olds is very different 
from that of  18 and 19 year olds. While 90% of the younger boys are in 
school, only 48% of the older boys are. Among the 16 and 17 year olds 
who are classified as unemployed, nearly 80% are in school and less than 
25% are seeking full-time work. In contrast, among the 18 and 19 year 
olds who are classified as unemployed, only 29% are in school and more 
than 75% are seeking full-time work. Only 1.8% of  the 16 and 17 years 
olds are out of school, unemployed, and seeking full time work. We are 
reminded that the official unemployment rate once included the experi- 
ence of  14 and 15 year olds but that the age limit was raised to reflect the 
growing school enrollment of this group. It may again be time to raise the 
age threshold for official labor force participation. Excluding 16 and 17 
year olds, with their official unemployment rate of more than 20%, would 
reduce the overall unemployment rate for men of  all ages from 7.2% to 
6.9%. 
These comments should not be taken as minimizing the importance of 
unemployment for some young people. The figures  do  show however that 
only a very small fraction of teenagers are unemployed and that only 46% 
of  the unemployed  are both  not in  school and looking for full-time 
employment. Less than 5% of  teenage boys are out of school, without 
work, and seeking full-time employment. 
2.  Most spells of  teenage unemployment are quite short and most teen- 
age jobseekers have relatively little trouble in finding  work. The bulk of 
unemployment is experienced by a relatively small group of teenagers with 
long spells of  unemployment. 
Short spells are characteristic of  most out-of-school male teenagers 
who become unemployed. In October 1976,45.5% of the unemployed in 
this group had been unemployed for four weeks or less. The survey also 
found that 16.2% of the unemployed in this group had been unemployed 
for between five and eight weeks. Only 10.7% of all the unemployed in 
the survey had been unemployed for as long as twenty-six weeks. Be- 
cause those who find work relatively quickly are less likely to be counted 
in the distribution of  unemployed, these figures actually overstate the Table 2.1  Activities of Male Teenagers (March 1976) 
16-17  18-19  16-19 
Percentage of  Percentage of  Percentage of 
Population  population  Population  population  Population  population 
In school 
Employed  1,307,233  31.1  731,300  18.5  2,038,533  25.0 
Full time  22,000  0.5  28,399  0.7  50,399  0.6 
Part time  295,419  7.0  98,221  2.5  393,640  4.8 
Not in labor force  2,174,278  51.8  1,048,669  26.5  3,222,947  39.5 
Total population  3,798,930  90.4  1,906,589  48.3  5,705,519  69.9 
Employed  209,259  5.0  1,506,038  38.1  1,715,297  21.0 
Unemployed  317,419  7.5  126,620  3.2  444,039  5.4 
Not in school 
Unemployed  82,454  2.0  316,251  8.0  398,705  4.9 
Full time  74,949  1.8  304,355  7.7  379,304  4.7 
Part time  7,505  0.2  11,896  0.3  19,401  0.2 
Not in labor force  105,996  2.5  226,980  5.7  332,976  4.1 
Total population  397,709  9.6  2,049,269  51.7  2,446,978  30.1 
population  4,196,639  100.0  3,955,858  100.0  8,152,497  100.0 
Total civilian 
SOURCE:  Tabulations of  the October 1976 Current Population Survey. 22  Martin Feldstein and David T. Ellwood 
fraction of  longer spells. In fact, considerably more than one-half of all 
the teenage boys who become unemployed are no longer so within just 
one month.* 
The experience of young people during the summer also implies that 
finding employment is not difficult for most young people.  Although 
detailed data is not available by sex and the level of  school attainment, 
the published figures permit us to trace the overall experience of  teen- 
agers of  both sexes on a month-by-month bask9  In March 1976, 3.8 
million 16 to 19  year olds were in the full-time labor force. This rose to 7.0 
million in June, 8.3 million in July, and 7.5 million in August before 
dropping back to approximately 4 million for the rest of the year. Of the 
4.5 million extra entrants into the full-time labor force between March 
and July, 4.0 million or 89% were working in July. Although the number 
of unemployed rose between the spring and summer, the unemployment 
rate actually fell sharply from 22.6% in March to 16.3% in July and 
15.3% in August. It is clear that this comparatively able group of teenage 
boys and girls had relatively little difficulty finding work. 
The labor market's ability to increase teenage employment by more 
than 100% between May and July is certainly remarkable. Employers 
clearly anticipate  a seasonal increase in  the supply of  teenagers and 
organize production to take advantage of their availability. We are struck 
by the contrast between this experience and the claim that much of the 
current high teenage unemployment rate is due to the demographic shift 
that increased teenagers from 7% of the labor force in 1958  to 10% today. 
If  production can adjust so rapidly to the seasonal shift in the demo- 
graphic composition of the labor force, it would be surprising if  it could 
not adjust to the much slower change in demography over the past two 
decades. This leads us to believe that too much weight has generally been 
given to the demographic explanation for the rising teenage unemploy- 
ment rate. 
While most teenagers have little problem with unemployment, teenage 
unemployment is concentrated in a group that experiences long periods 
of unemployment. Table 2.2 presents information on the distribution of 
unemployment in 1975 based on the responses of the out-of-school group 
in the March 1976 Current Population Survey.'O Table 2.2 reveals that in 
1975 nearly two-thirds of these teenagers experienced no unemployment 
at all. Another 13% were unemployed for a total of less than two months. 
Only one teenager in twelve was out of  work for a total of  more than 
twenty-six weeks during the year, but this high unemployment group 
accounted  for 52%  of  all the weeks of  unemployment  among these 
teenagers. Thus about half  of  all unemployment among male out-of- 
school teenagers in a year is concentrated in a group of roughly 250,000 
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Table 2.2  Distribution of Population and Total Unemployment 
bv Weeks UnemDloved in the Previous Year 
Percentage of  those  Percentage of  all 
Weeks unemployed  Percentage of  with some  unemployment 







63.7  0.0 
8.5  23.5 
4.9  13.5 
5.2  14.4 
9.3  25.7 








SOURCE:  Tabulations of  the March 1976 Current Population Survey. All  figures refer to 
male teenagers whose major activity in March 1976 was not classified as attending school. 
3. Many of the teenagers who are out-of-school  and out-of-work  are not 
ojjicially classified as “unemployed. ”  Most of this “out of the labor force” 
group show relatively little interest in finding work. For many of them, 
there is relatively little pressure or incentive to find work. 
More than 45%  of  the out-of-school but not employed teenage boys 
are officially classified as out of the labor force rather than unemployed.” 
This means they reported engaging in no work-seeking activity during the 
previous four weeks, including such things as asking friends or looking in 
the newspaper. The evidence that we present later in this section indi- 
cates that only a relatively small proportion of these young men would 
really like to work. 
Kim  Clark and Lawrence Summers12  have shown that a substantial 
fraction of all measured spells of  unemployment end with the individual 
leaving the labor force. They argue that the distinction between young- 
sters who are out of work and seeking a job and those who are out of work 
but not seeking employment is questionable and suggest further that most 
persons without work might be regarded as unemployed. According to 
this interpretation current unemployment figures understate the magni- 
tude of  the problem. While we agree that the distinction between the 
unemployed and those out of  the labor force may be poorly captured in 
the data, our evidence suggests that the vast majority of those out of the 
labor force cannot reasonably be classified as “unemployed”  with its 
implication of active interest in finding work. Indeed, it is quite possible 
that current unemployment figures overstate the problem since many 
unemployed  move  frequently to the out-of-the-labor-force  status in 
which few report a desire for work. 
Our interpretation of  this evidence reflects our conclusion that the 
young men who are out of the labor force are not “discouraged workers” 
who have stopped looking because they believe no work is available. We 
have reached this conclusion after analyzing the data about the out-of- 24  Martin Feldstein and David T. EUwd 
the-labor-force group that was collected in the March 1976 survey. These 
data are of  two types: (1) questions about the individual’s interest in 
working and beliefs about job a~ailability,’~  and (2) evidence on the 
financial incentives and pressures to seek work. 
When the out-of-school teenagers who had not done anything to look 
for work during the past four weeks were asked, “DO  you want a job 
now?”, only 37% answered yes.I4  Forty-six percent said no and 17% said 
they did not know.I5 
Among the out-of-the-labor-force group, only 18% said they wanted a 
job but believed there was no work or couldn’t find any, and 2.8% said 
that the prospective employers thought they were too young. Thus no 
more than 21% of  those in the out-of-the-labor-force group desire em- 
ployment but believe that search would not result in finding a job. In 63% 
of  the cases, the individual just did not want a job. An additional 7.1% 
said they did not look because they were attending school even though 
school was not given as their major activity. 
We believe that much of the high unemployment and nonemployment 
rates among the out-of-school young men reflect the lack of  pressure or 
incentive to find work. Although unemployment insurance is relatively 
unimportant for this age group,I6  the family acts as an alternative source 
of  income when young people are not working.” More than 87% of  the 
unemployed in this group live with parents (80.5%) or other relatives 
(7.0%). Only 7.5% live alone or with a family of  their own. Among the 
group that is not in the labor force, 97% live with parents (89.6%) or 
other relatives (7.4%). While the unemployed teenagers come dispro- 
portionately from lower income families, nearly two-thirds of the unem- 
ployed were in families with incomes above $10,000 in 1976 and 22% 
were in families with incomes over $20,000. 
4.  The problem of  unemployment and nonemployment is concentrated 
in a group with little education. The unemployment and nonemployment 
rates  in  this group drop sharply  as its members move into their early 
twenties. Nevertheless, the rates remain very high among those who do not 
complete high school. 
Since unemployment  is  concentrated in  a group of  teenagers with 
relatively little schooling, it is worth emphasizing that nearly 70% of  16  to 
19 year old males are still in  school. The out-of-school group whose 
unemployment we are studying therefore left school before two-thirds of 
those in their age cohort. Moreover, for our out-of school group, unem- 
ployment rates are much higher among those who did not complete high 
school (twelve years of  education). Table 2.3 shows that these school 
dropouts accounted for 57.5%  of  the unemployed and 58.0% of  the 
nonemployed. They had an unemployment rate of 28.2% and a nonem- 
ployment rate of  42.1%.  The rates for nonwhite dropouts were even 
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Table 2.3  Education and Unemployment 
Years of  schooling 
Less than  More than 
12 years  12 years  12 years  All 
Percentage distribution of 
Population  41.2  53.8  5.1  100.0 
Labor force  38.4  56.9  4.7  100.0 
Unemployed  57.5  40.2  2.3  100.0 
Nonemployed  58.0  37.3  4.7  100.0 
Unemployment rates 
Whites  ,264  ,105  .069  .163 
Nonwhites  .412  ,396  ,513  ,406 
All  ,282  .133  .093  .189 
Nonemployment rates 
Whites  .386  ,171  ,216  ,259 
Nonwhites  ,618  .501  ,796  .571 
All  ,421  .208  .277  .299 
SOURCE:  Tabulations of  the October 1976 Current Population Survey. All figures relate to 
teenage boys who were not enrolled in school at the time of  the survey. 
Table 2.4 compares the unemployment rates of  teenagers with the 
unemployment  rates of  20 to 24  year olds at each level of  education. 
Among those with less than twelve years of  education, the unemploy- 
ment rate drops from 0.282 to 0.175, a drop of 38%. The decreases for the 
two groups with more years of  schooling is relatively smaller (a 20% 
decline for both groups), but the final unemployment rates are substan- 
tially lower. Among 20 to 24 year olds, those who did not complete high 
school have nearly twice the unemployment rate of  those who did. Note 
that the unemployment rate for all 20 to 24 year olds (0.110) is actually 
42% lower than the teenage rate, reflecting the change in the mix of  the 
labor force to those with more education and lower unemployment rates 
as well as the decline in rates within each demographic group. 
Table 2.4 
Years of  Age and race 
schooling  Age  Whites  Nonwhites 
Unemployment Rates by Age and Education 
16-19  2&24  16-19  20-24  16-19  20-24 
Less than 
12 years  ,282  .175  ,264  ,151  ,412  .276 
12 years  ,133  ,106  .lo5  ,098  ,396  ,168 
More than 
12 years  ,093  .074  ,069  ,063  ,513  .184 
All  ,189  ,110  .163  ,097  .406  ,207 
SOURCE:  Tabulations of the October 1976 Current Population Survey. All figures relate to 
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A similar pattern is seen for each race group. Among those with less 
than twelve years of  education, the white unemployment rate drops by 
43% and the nonwhite unemployment rate drops by 33%. For the groups 
with more education, the gains are relatively greater for nonwhites but 
the sample is too small to regard these differences as statistically sig- 
nificant. 
Table 2.5  presents comparable  figures for nonemployment.  It will 
again be seen that the rates for the lowest education group improve 
substantially with time but still remain quite high. Once again, the total 
rate declines by more than the decline at each education level because the 
out-of-school population changes to include a higher proportion of young 
men with more education. 
Although these two tables show that there is a substantial improvement 
in the condition of the poorly educated teenagers as they age, the figures 
should also serve as a warning that the problem of  high unemployment 
and nonemployment among the low-education group does not fully cor- 
rect itself as these problem teenagers get older. 
5.  Nonwhites  have  considerably  higher  rates of  unemployment  and 
nonemployment than do whites. However, since nonwhites are a relatively 
small fraction of  the teenage population,  they account for only a small 
portion of unemployment and nonemployment. Lowering the unemploy- 
ment rate of  the nonwhite group to the rate of  the  white group would 
eliminate less than 60,000 unemployed teenagers in the whole country and 
would only lower the unemployment rate for all out-of-school male teen- 
agers from 19%  to 16%. 
Nonwhite  teenagers  suffer very  high  rates  of  unemployment  and 
nonemployment.  Forty  percent  were  unemployed  in  October  1976; 
nearly 60% were without work. While these figures  clearly show a serious 
employment problem for nonwhite teenagers, it should be remembered 
that since the bulk of  teenagers are white, the bulk of  the out-of-school 
teenage unemployed are also white. 
Table 2.5 
Years of  Age and race 
schooling  Age  Whites  Nonwhites 
Nonemployment Rates by Age and Education 
16-19  20-24  16-19  20-24  1&19  20-24 
Less than 
12 years  ,421  ,264  .386  ,215  ,618  ,436 
12 years  ,208  ,147  ,171  .129  .501  ,286 
More than 
12 years  .277  ,112  .216  ,101  ,796  .235 
All  ,299  ,162  ,259  .137  ,571  ,330 
~ 
SOURCE:  Tabulations of  the October 1976  Current Population Survey. All figures relate to 
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Table 2.6 summarizes the racial composition of  unemployment and 
nonemployment among out-of-school male teenagers. Since nonwhites 
constitute only 12.7% of the 2.45 million boys in this group, they account 
for only a small fraction of  the overall unemployment and nonemploy- 
ment despite their relatively high unemployment and nonemployment 
rates. In October 1976, whites represented 77% of the unemployed, 76% 
of  the not employed, and 14% of  those not in the labor force. Even 
among  those  out  of  work  for  twenty-three weeks  or more,  whites 
accounted for 77%. 
By using the March 1976 survey, it is possible to obtain additional 
information on the relative magnitudes of white and nonwhite unemploy- 
ment. (This requires using the “major activity” criteria of  classifying an 
individual’s “school” status; this decreases the in-school population and 
raises the share of  whites in the unemployed from 77% to 8l%.) The 
March survey figures  indicate that whites accounted for 79% of those who 
experienced at least twenty-six weeks of unemployment in 1975 and 80% 
of  the weeks of  unemployment  in  that year. The March survey also 
provides evidence on unemployment in  the central cities of  Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas. Because nonwhites constituted 24.3% of 
the male teenage out-of-school labor force in the central cities of  Stan- 
dard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (in comparison to 24.2% nationally), 
they accounted for a larger share of total unemployment in central cities. 
But even there, nonwhites represented only 36% of  the unemployed. 
Whites accounted for 64% of the unemployment in the central cities and 
84% outside the SMSAs.18  Even among families with incomes of less than 
$10,000, whites accounted for 70% of the unemployment nationally and 
50% in central cities. The stereotyped image of an unemployed teenager 
Table 2.6  Unemployment Experience of White and Nonwhite 
Out-of-school Male Teenagers 
Unemployment 
Number  Proportion  and non- 
of  persons  of  persons  employment rates 
White  Nonwhite  White  Nonwhite  White  Nonwhite 
Unemployed”  307,214  91,491  77.1  22.9  ,163“  .406 
Not employedb  553,382  178,299  75.6  24.4  .259‘  .571 
Not in labor force’  246,168  86,808  73.9  26.1  .115’  .278 
Long term unemployed 
(more than 13 weeks 
in the current spell)  81,619  23,973  77.3  22.7  N/A  N/A 
SOURCE:  Tabulations of the October 1976 Current Population Survey. All figures relate to 
teenage boys who were not enrolled in school at the time of  the survey. 
aRate as a percentage of  labor force. 
bRate as a percentage of population. 28  Martin Feldstein and David T. Ellwood 
as a black central city resident represents less than 15% of  the unem- 
ployed. 
The figures in table 2.6 imply that reducing the nonwhite unemploy- 
ment rate from 40.6% to the 16.2% that prevailed among whites would 
cut  nonwhite  unemployment  from  91,491 to 36,732,  a reduction  of 
54,759. This accounts for only 13.4% of the total of 408,705 unemployed 
male out-of-school teenagers. Reducing the nonwhite unemployment 
rate to the white rate would therefore only lower the total unemployment 
rate from 18.9% to 16.3. 
Again, we want to stress that we are not minimizing the importance of 
the high rates of  unemployment and nonemployment among the non- 
white teenagers.  With  57%  not employed, there  is  clearly a serious 
employment  problem  among nonwhite  out-of-school teenagers. It is 
important, however, to recognize that the vast majority of employed and 
nonemployed teenagers are white. Reducing the unemployment rate of 
nonwhite teenagers to the corresponding rate for whites would eliminate 
less than 15% of all the current unemployment among teenage boys who 
are not in school. 
6. Approximately half  of  the difference between the  unemployment 
rates of  white and nonwhites can be accounted for by other demographic 
and  economic differences. Among the very low income households, the 
unemployment rates of  whites and  nonwhites are similar. Rising family 
income appears to be associated with a much greater fall in the unemploy- 
ment rate for whites than for nonwhites. 
We have examined how unemployment rates differ within each race by 
schooling, family income, and age. More specifically, we have divided the 
population into forty-eight non-overlapping groups based on all interac- 
tions among these three factors. Thus one group contains only those 17 
year olds with exactly twelve years of schooling  who live in a family whose 
income (excluding that of the teenagers) is between $10,000 and $20,000. 
Each group is further divided into whites and nonwhites, and the unem- 
ployment  rate is  calculated for each subgroup.  On  the basis of  this 
detailed information, we can calculate how much of  the whitehonwhite 
difference in unemployment rates is due to differences between the rates 
in each of the forty-eight demographic groups and how much is due to 
differences in the demographic composition of  the white and nonwhite 
groups.I9  The results are summarized in the first two columns of table 2.7. 
The actual unemployment rate for white, male, teenage boys who are 
out of school is 16.3%; the corresponding rate for nonwhites is 40.6%. If 
nonwhites had the same demographic composition as whites but retained 
their annual unemployment rates in each demographic group, their over- 
all unemployment rate would fall from 40.6% to 27.9%. This is shown in 
table 2.7 as the unemployment rate based on “white weights and non- 
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Table 2.7  Demographically Adjusted Unemployment and 
Nonemolovment Rates of Whites and Nonwhites 
Unemployment rates  Nonemployment rates 
White  Nonwhite  White  Nonwhite 
weights  weights  weights  weights 
White  ,163  ,210  .259  ,325 
Nonwhite  .279  ,406  .469  ,571 
SOURCE:  Tabulations of  the October 1976 Current Population Survey. All figures refer to 
out-of-school male teenagers. 
composition of the two race groups accounts for 12.7  percentage points of 
the 24.3 percentage point difference in the overall unemployment rates, 
i.e., for more than 50% of  the difference between the races. 
Table 2.7 also shows the implications of  reversing this procedure and 
calculating the unemployment rate that whites would have if  they re- 
tained their actual unemployment rate in each demographic group but 
had  the same demographic composition  as the nonwhites.  With the 
nonwhite demographic weights, the white unemployment rate would rise 
from 16.3% to 21.0%, an increase of 4.7 percentage points or only about 
20% of the difference between the observed unemployment rates. 
Similar calculations for nonemployment rates are also presented in 
table 2.7. The first type of  adjustment, i.e., using the white demographic 
composition, results in a decrease in the nonwhite nonemployment rate 
from 31.2 percentage points to 21.0 percentage points, a reduction of 
33%. Similarly, applying nonwhite weights to white unemployment rates 
raises the white nonemployment rate from 25.9% to 32.5%, and accounts 
for only 21% of  the race difference in nonemployment rates. 
In short, a limited set of demographic factors can account for a substan- 
tial part of the racial difference in unemployment rates and a smaller part 
of  the difference in nonemployment rates. Changing the demographic 
weights is more important for the nonwhite population than for whites. 
We have extended our analysis of  the relationship between race and 
unemployment by examining the unemployment rates of white and non- 
white teenagers in families at different income levels.M  Two interesting 
conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, among low income families 
there is relatively little difference in the unemployment rates of  whites 
and nonwhites. More precisely, in families with incomes below $10,OOO 
(excluding any income of the teenager) white out-of-school boys had an 
unemployment rate of 0.26 while nonwhites had a rate of 0.30. Similarly, 
the nonemployment rates for whites was 0.39 while that for nonwhites 
was 0.45. 
Our second finding  is that rising family income appears to be associated 
with  a much  greater fall in unemployment  rates for whites than  for 
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0.26 in families with  incomes below $10,000 to 0.14 in families with 
incomes of $10,000 to $20,000.  The nonwhites show no decline at all; the 
unemployment rate actually rises slightly from 0.30 to 0.33. The same 
lack of improvement with income is seen in the nonemployment rates of 
nonwhites; while the white nonemployment rate drops from 0.39 to 0.22, 
the nonwhite rates rises from 0.45 to 0.54. Only when family incomes rise 
to more  than  $20,000 does  the experience of  whites and  nonwhites 
become similar. The unemployment rates for this income group are 0.26 
and 0.18 for whites and nonwhites respectively while the corresponding 
nonemployment rates are 0.24 and 0.25. 
The poor employment of middle-income nonwhites remains a puzzle to 
us. Our sample is too small to pursue this by further disaggregation, but 
we believe that much could be learned by pooling samples in order to 
explore whether this apparent difference between middle-income whites 
and nonwhites was just due to chance in our sample and, if not, whether it 
can be explained by such factors as location or education. 
Conclusion 
It is our conclusion that unemployment is not a serious problem for the 
vast majority of teenage boys. School is the predominant activity of the 
young. For many of the out-of-school but not employed group, the data 
provide evidence of  weak labor force attachment and little incentive or 
pressure to find work. Most youngsters who do seek work remain unem- 
ployed only a short time. 
Nonwhites suffer disproportionately high unemployment rates, but 
whites still represent the vast majority of  unemployed young people. 
Nearly half of the differences in white and nonwhite unemployment rates 
are attributable to demographic differences in age, schooling, and family 
income. Unemployment rates of whites and nonwhites appear to be much 
more similar at the high and low ends of the income distribution than in 
the middle. The mystery is the middle-class nonwhite teenagers who 
suffer far more unemployment than their white counterparts. 
There is a small group of  relatively poorly educated young men for 
whom teenage unemployment is a serious problem. High school dropouts 
suffer over half of  the teenage unemployment and these persons show 
only a slow improvement as they reach their twenties. 
In considering these findings, it should be borne in mind that the results 
reported in this paper are based on samples for 1976 only. As we noted 
above, we have repeated the analysis by  examining data from 1975 and 
1977 and found quite similar results. It would nevertheless be useful to 
extend these calculations to other years in which economic conditions 
were substantially different from 1975 through 1977. 31  Teenage Unemployment: What Is the Problem? 
This paper is not the place to discuss the implications of  our evidence 
for appropriate policies to deal with youth unemployment. It is appropri- 
ate, however, to conclude with a few words of  caution. Since we have 
emphasized that the real problem of teenage unemployment is currently 
concentrated in the relatively small group that experiences long periods 
of unemployment, it may be tempting to believe that the problem could 
be solved by a program of targeted job creation. The 250,000 boys with 
long periods of unemployment who currently account for more than half 
of  the year’s unemployment among out-of-school teenage boys could in 
principle be hired at a cost of $3 billion even if  they were paid more than 
twice the minimum wage. The primary danger in such an approach is that 
the provision of relatively attractive public sector jobs could induce a very 
much larger number of  boys to seek such positions. This could detour 
many of  those who have little or no problem with unemployment away 
from more productive jobs or  from additional schooling. The challenge to 
public policy is thus to create opportunities for employment and on-the- 
job training for those who would otherwise experience long periods of 
nonemployment without providing adverse incentives to the vast major- 
ity of  young people.  21 
Notes 
1. Individuals who are on layoff from a job to which they expect to be recalled are also 
classified as unemployed even if  they are not actively seeking work. 
2. The unemployment rate for a demographic group is calculated as  the percentage of the 
members of the corresponding labor force who are currently classified as unemployed. The 
labor force is defined as everyone in that demographic group who is either employed or 
unemployed. An individual may be both attending school and in the labor force if  he or she 
is working part time or full time or is looking for such work. 
3.  In the earlier version of  this paper, we focused on the male teenagers who do not 
report attending school as their “major activity.” An individual may be enrolled but also 
working, For most purposes, the two methods of  classification give similar results but we 
were convinced by subsequent comment and analysis that classifying by enrollment is more 
appropriate, especially for 16 and 17  year olds. 
4. We are of course aware that remaining in school represents an economic decision and 
should in principle be regarded as endogenous to the problem we are studying. It would be 
interesting to extend the current analysis to examine the relation between work availability 
and the decision to remain in school. 
5. In estimating unemployment and employment rates, a sample of 100 yields a standard 
error of  no more than 0.005. Appendix table 2.A.l  presents selected sample sizes. Table 
2.A.2 presents the standard errors for probabilities based on selected sample sizes. 
6. We have repeated the  analysis for the two other recent years for which data are 
available, 1975 and 1977. The results are quite similar to those for 1976 reported in the text 
of  this paper. 32  Martin Feldstein and David T. Ellwood 
7. Recall that we classify as “in school” anyone who is enrolled, whether or not school is 
his major activity. If  we use the “major activity” basis of  classification instead, the number 
of  out-of-school boys who are seeking full-time work is essentially unchanged at 394,000. 
The total unemployed  and out-of-school group (seeking part-time or full-time work) is 
399,000 based on “enrollment”  and 416,000 based on “major activity.” 
8. Clark and Summers report that 70% of  spells end in one month; some of these spells 
end with the teenagers leaving the labor force. See Kim B. Clark and Lawrence Summers, 
“The Dynamics of  Youth Unemployment,”  chapter 7 of  the present volume. 
9. These figures come from the 1977 Handbook of  Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of 
Labor, 1978). 
10. The March survey is used for these calculations because information on unemploy- 
ment in the previous year is not collected in October. 
11. An individual is classified as out of  the labor force if he is neither employed nor 
seeking work. The figures in table 2.1 indicate that there were 333,000 teenage boys who 
were not in the labor force in October 1976. By comparison there were 399,000 unemployed 
boys. The out-of-the-labor force group thus accounted for more than 45% of  those who 
were out of  school but not working. 
12. Kim B. Clark and Lawrence Summers, chapter 7 of  this volume. 
13. These questions are asked only of a random subsample of the out-of-the-labor-force 
group. Some of this information is available for March and not for October. 
14. The question in the CPS may be answered by one adult in the household  for all 
persons in the household. The questions about a teenager are typically answered by his 
mother although the group that is out of school and out of work may be more likely than 
usual to be present at the interview. 
15.  Although the sample of  individuals who were asked this question was so small that 
these percentages cannot be regarded as precise estimates of  the true percentages for all 
teenagers who were out of the labor force, there are enough observations to assert that there 
is less than one chance in ten of  observing an estimated “yes” response rate as low as 37% if 
the “true”  fraction of  potential  “yes”  responses is even 50% or  higher.  (Evidence for 
October 1976  further supports this conclusion since an even lower fraction of the out-of-the- 
labor-force group expressed interest in working.) 
16. Data on the receipt of unemployment benefits were collected in a special May 1976 
survey. Only 10% of  unemployed male teenagers not in school received unemployment 
benefits. 
17. It would be very interesting to have more data on the way in which a young person’s 
unemployment affects his family’s cash and in-kind gifts to him and his expected contribu- 
tion to the overall family budget. 
18. Among the 370,273 unemployed whites, 97,701 lived in central cities of SMSAs. For 
nonwhites, the corresponding figures are 88,964 and 55,781. 
19. Although  the number of  observations in each of  the forty-eight cells is small, the 
standard error of the mean depends essentially on the total number of  observations. Similar 
results are obtained with the data for the March Survey. 
20.  We use the March 1976 survey to obtain more detailed income information. 
21.  See the discussion of  such policies in Martin Feldstein, “Lowering the Permanent 
Rate of  Unemployment,” Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress (Government Print- 
ing Office: Washington, 1973) and Martin Feldstein, “Economics of the New Unemploy- 
ment,” The Public Interest (1973). 33  Teenage Unemployment: What Is the Problem? 
Table 2.A.1  Selected Sample Sizes of Males Not Enrolled in School (October 1976) 
14-19  20-24 
October  White  Nonwhite  White  Nonwhite 
All education levels 
Population  1250  201  3460  461 
Labor force  1106  154  3305  396 
Population  507  97  654  166 
Labor force  421  68  604  132 
Under 12 years education 
12 years education 
Population  680  96  1757  202 
Labor force  632  82  1696  167 
Over 12 years education 
Population  63  8  1049  93 
Labor force  53  4  1005  88 
Table 2.A.2  Table of Standard Errors for Probabilities 
Estimated probability of  rate 
Sample Size  .1 or .9  .2 or .8  .3 or .7  .4 or .6  .5 or .5 
10  .10  .13  .15  .16  .17 
25  .06  .08  .09  .10  .10 
50  .04  .06  .07  .07  .07 
100  .03  .04  .05  .05  .05 
250  .02  .03  .03  .03  .03 
500  .01  .02  .02  .02  .02 
lo00  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01 This Page Intentionally Left Blank3  The Youth Labor Market 
Problem in the 
United States: An Overview 
Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff 
The unemployed young person has replaced the unemployed breadwin- 
ner as the focus of much concern about joblessness in the United States 
and other countries.  In part, the upsurge of  interest  reflects a major 
demographic development of the 1960s  and 1970s-the increased propor- 
tion of young persons in the population-which  has raised the youth 
share of the unemployed. In part, it also reflects an upward trend in rates 
of  joblessness  among  some  groups  of  young persons,  most  notably 
blacks, relative to the population as a whole. Considerable social concern 
has also been  expressed about the correlates of  youth joblessness- 
crime,  violence  in  schools,  illegitimate  births,  and  suicide,  among 
others-and  about potential long-term consequences in the form of  a 
“lost generation” of  young workers. What are the quantitative dimen- 
sions of the youth joblessness problem in the United States? In what ways 
is youth unemployment similar or dissimilar to adult unemployment? 
How concentrated is the problem among minorities? To what extent is 
the lack of  employment associated with other major social problems? 
What questions and topics must be addressed if we are to understand the 
nature of  the youth labor market problem? 
This chapter examines these questions with information from various 
sources. It presents an overview of the nature of the youth labor market 
problem in the U.S.,  sets out the principal patterns in the data, and 
develops the questions to which they give rise. Section 3.1 focuses on job 
market phenomena as depicted in Current Population Survey (CPS) and 
related data. It shows that the problem of high and increasing joblessness 
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